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a b s t r a c t
Emotion or stress can jeopardize decision-making relevance and cognitive functioning. In
this paper we examine plan continuation error (PCE), an erroneous behavior defined as a
‘‘failure to revise a flight plan despite emerging evidence that suggests it is no longer safe’’
(Orasanu et al., 2001). Our hypothesis is that negative emotional consequences attached to
the go-around decision provoke a temporary impairment of the decision-making process
and favor PCE. We investigated this hypothesis with a simplified landing task in which
two possible contributors to those emotions, namely the uncertainty of a decision outcome
and the reward/punishment, associated to the outcome were manipulated. A behavioral
experiment (n = 12) and a second one (n = 6) using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) were conducted. Behavioral results of both studies showed the effectiveness of the
financial incentive to bias decision making toward a more risky and less rational behavior
from a safety point of view. Neuroimaging data showed that the PCE behavior was under-
pinned by the contribution of brain circuitry of emotion and reward during the decision-
making process. Taken together, behavioral and fMRI result support the hypothesis that
PCE can be provoked by a temporary impairment of rational decision-making due to the
negative emotional consequences attached with the go-around.
1. Introduction
Approach and landing are critical flight phases that require formalized sequences of actions (e.g. to lower the gear down, to
extend the flaps) and to follow an arrival procedure through several waypoints. Uncertainty, a worsening factor since it gen-
erates psychological stress, deleterious to piloting activity (Katsis et al., 2010), can be high during landing. According to the
legislation, hazardous conditions (e.g. unstabilized approach, vehicles on the runway, strong crosswind or wind shear) require
to go-around to perform a new safe attempt or to divert to another airport. The go-around decision-making rules follow legal
guidelines that are adapted by aircraft manufacturers in their operating manual (e.g. crosswind limitation, use of autopilots,
etc.) and airport authorities (decision gates, speed envelopes, sink rates, etc.). In addition, pilots should use their own judg-
ment and may decide to perform a go-around at any time. A study conducted by MIT (Rhoda and Pawlak, 1999) has demon-
strated that in 2000 cases of approaches under thunderstorm conditions, two aircrews out of three keep on landing in spite of
adverse meteorological conditions. This phenomenon called plan continuation error (PCE) (Orasanu et al., 2001) also exists in
general aviation. Indeed, the BEA (the French Accident Investigation Bureau) revealed that this pilots’ trend to land (the get-
home-itis syndrome) have been responsible for more than 41.5% of casualties in general aviation (BEA, 2000).
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Many experiments have addressed the difficulty for pilots to revise their flight plan and several cognitive and psychoso-
cial explanatory hypotheses have been put forward such as weather related change blindness (Muthard andWickens, 2003),
reduced updating abilities in working memory (Causse et al., 2011b,c; Ebbatson et al., 2007), task commitment issues and
psychological stress (Dehais et al., 2011, 2012) or poor risk assessment (O’ Hare and Smitheram, 1995; Wiegmann et al.,
2002; Wiggins and O’Hare, 1995). Another contributing factor to PCE may reside in the large range of aversive consequences
associated with the decision to go-around (Causse et al., 2011a). Indeed, a go-around can generate a psychological stress and/
or a high uncertainty in the crew and the passengers, and it may lead to difficulties to reinsert into the landing pattern. For
instance, Bonner and Wilson (2002) found that reported subjective mental workload and heart rate (physiological index of
mental stress) were higher during go-around in comparison to others flight segments. This is a quite rare event and pilots
lack pre-programmed responses whereas the flight plan must be rapidly updated. Moreover, a go-around has important eco-
nomic consequences for the airline due to extra fuel consumption. One now-defunct airline used to pay passengers one dol-
lar for each minute their flight was late until a crew attempted to land through a thunderstorm and crashed (Nance, 1986).
According to Orasanu and colleagues (2001), airlines also emphasize fuel economy and getting passengers to their destina-
tions rather diverting the flight, perhaps inadvertently sending mixed messages to their pilots concerning safety versus pro-
ductivity. Those blurred messages create conflicting motives, which can affect unconsciously pilots’ risk assessments and the
course of action they choose.
In a landing phase, decision-making processes are generally based upon rational elements like the maximum crosswind
speed for a given aircraft. However, emotional pressures can alter the rational reasoning by shifting decision-making criteria
from safety rules to subjective ones (aversion to negative emotion). Indeed, experiencing an emotion has an ambiguous role
in decision making. It can trigger unconscious processes useful to decision making, in particular when the uncertainty is high
(Damasio, 1994). However, emotion or stress can also jeopardize decision-making relevance and cognitive functioning, in
particular during complex tasks that involve higher cognitive abilities like executive functions, mainly but not only,
implemented in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Schoofs et al., 2009). Abelson and Clarke (1963) were the firsts
to oppose reason-based ‘‘cold cognition’’ to emotionally influenced ‘‘hot cognition’’. In this perspective, hot cognition
integrates the influence of affect, for example during reasoning. Many authors have since confirmed the existence of a shift
from rational cold reasoning to emotional hot reasoning and its cerebral underpinning has been demonstrated (Mitchell and
Phillips, 2007). Neuroscientists commonly use such distinction in studies that examine relationships between cognitive and
emotional processes. For instance, Goel and Dolan (2003) have explored the neural network involved in cold reasoning ver-
sus hot reasoning. In their experiment, participants had to solve syllogisms during an fMRI experiment. Half of the syllogism
verbal content was neutral (cold) whereas the other half was emotionally salient (hot). Hot reasoning resulted in enhanced
activation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) whereas cold reasoning resulted in enhanced activity in DLPFC, high-
lighting that different regions are recruited during decision making according to the emotional state of participants. Such a
cerebral shift may affect performance, accuracy of decision making and or reasoning (Simpson et al., 2001).
Neuroeconomics has widely studied the influence of emotional factors, such as incentive, on economic decision-making
under uncertainty and its underlying neural bases. Monetary incentive is widely used since it is a good mean to reproduce
real life emotions. Indeed, financial reward is associated with neuronal activities in the same regions that respond to
emotions and primary reinforcers (Elliott et al., 2003). Taylor et al. (2004) highlighted the efficiency of financial incentive
to bias cognitive processes such as short-term memory and object recognition. Therefore a parallel could be drawn between
neuroeconomics experimental situations and pilots facing a conflict between expected punishments (extra fuel consump-
tion, fatigue caused by a second landing attempt, etc.) and rewards (bring passengers without delay).
We adopted a neuroergonomics approach (Parasuraman and Rizzo, 2007; Sarter and Sarter, 2003) and developed an
experimental paradigm inspired from neuroeconomics brain imaging protocol to investigate the impact of the emotional
cost of a go-around on decision-making during a plausible landing-decision situation. Neuroimaging data were collected
to bring objective clues on the cognitive and emotional processes involved in PCE. Our overall hypothesis is that, besides cog-
nitive and psychosocial factors, a large range of strong negative emotional consequences attached to the go-around decision
provokes a temporary impairment of the decision-making process and favors PCE. We explored two possible sources of the
negative emotions: the uncertainty of the decision outcome and the reward or punishment associated to the outcome. Re-
ward should elicit an emotional response that could interfere with rational decision-making and the emotional bias should
increase with uncertainty (Katsis et al., 2010). We investigated our hypothesis in two experiments in which reward and
uncertainty were manipulated. Both experiments used the same simplified landing task. In the next section, we describe par-
ticipants’ characteristics and the experimental paradigm of both behavioral and fMRI experiments. Experimental results are
detailed in Section 3 and they are discussed in Section 4.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Two separate experiments were conducted with non-pilots. 12 healthy participants were recruited from the local popu-
lation to participate to the behavioral experiment (mean age = 28, SD = 3.69). In addition, six other healthy participants
(mean age 24, SD = 1.26) performed the same experiment within the fMRI. Pilots have years of training and their decisions
are based upon an important operational knowledge. However, we considered that the binary decision-making process in-
volved in landing decision without external visibility (mainly based on rhombuses’ positions) is quite generic and simple
(even if some other information can be considered in real situation, like altitude) and should be very similar in non-pilots.
All participants were right handed as measured by the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971). A professionally
trained clinical psychologist neuropsychologically examined all participants. Due to their influence on decision-making pro-
cesses, emotional disorders identification was based on impulsivity and anxiety assessment with the Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale (BIS-10) (Patton et al., 1995) and the Spielberger state anxiety inventory (STAI Y-A) (Spielberger, 1983). In all partic-
ipants, impulsivity and anxiety traits level were within a normal range (respectively, mean impulsivity = 63.5, SD = 9.91;
mean state anxiety = 41.14, SD = 4.67). The experiment was approved by the local ethics committee and an informed consent
was obtained before participation. Participants were paid for participating and were told that they would earn earned extra
money according to their performance during the task. Eventually, they all received the same maximal amount of money for
their participation at the end of the experiment.
2.2. Behavioral experiment
We used a 2  2 factorial design crossing two independent variables, the financial incentive and the uncertainty. The task
was based on 480  480 pixels simplified reproduction of a real flight instrument, the ILS (Instrument Landing System). This
instrument mainly supports the pilot’s decision-making during landing without external visibility. Since the automation of
the flight desk, the pilot’s activity mainly aims at monitoring the embedded systems and not at controlling manually the
flight itself. It is particularly true during the landing phase where pilots perform automatic landing and focus on Go/No–
Go decision-making. Indeed when pilots decide to go-around, the first major action is to push the throttle to trigger the auto-
mated go-around maneuver. In a second time, the go-around initiates a missed approach procedure, an optional flight seg-
ment that is depicted in the flight plan (altitude to reach, heading, etc.).
Participants were instructed that they were flying an airplane that had reached the decision altitude (the point of the ap-
proach where the pilot must decide if the flight has to be aborted or not) and that, like pilots, they were allowed to abort the
landing if they believed that landing was unsafe. Decisions were based on two elements of the ILS: the localizer and the glide
slope, which provide lateral and vertical guidance to adjust the trajectory of the aircraft to land on the runway. This infor-
mation was given by two rhombuses, like in real aircraft, displayed below and on the right of the artificial horizon (Fig. 1).
Participants were instructed that the landing was safe when both rhombuses were close to the center of their axes and that
the farthest from the center the rhombuses were, the higher the risk of crash was. Indeed, they were told that the rhombuses’
Fig. 1. Simplified reproduction of the decision-making environment during the landing phase. In the upper part, the real flight environment. From left to
right: the cockpit, the main instrument with ILS and the throttle. In the bottom part, the fMRI environment. From left to right: the fMRI, the simplified
instrument that supports decision making with the two rhombuses of the ILS (in white) and the response pad that allowed the Go–No–Go decision.
positions represented the vertical/lateral current position of the aircraft regarding an ideal approach flight-path. During
unstabilized approach, events may be strongly unpredictable and results of actions cannot be well anticipated. In our study,
we reproduced this uncertainty thanks to the level of ambiguity of the information provided by the instrument. Stimuli that
supported the landing decision were manipulated according to two level of uncertainty: low and high (Fig. 2). When the
rhombuses were in ‘‘fuzzy’’ positions (i.e. in between a straight go-around and a safe landing), the decision consequence
(accuracy and/or financial outcome) became unpredictable, which generated uncertainty. In the low-uncertainty condition,
decision making was quite simple as the rhombuses’ positions were not ambiguous: either the rhombuses were very far
from the centers of their axes, requiring a go-around (likelihood of successful landing: 0%), either they were very close from
the centers of their axes, requiring a landing acceptance (likelihood of successful landing: 100%). In the high-uncertainty con-
dition, decision making was complex as the rhombuses’ positions were ambiguous (i.e. borderline, not very far, and not very
close from the center of their axes). In this latter condition, the uncertainty was maximal as the likelihoods (unknown by the
participants) of successful landing or crash were equal (50%). Within a run, there was no repetition of a same rhombus
pattern.
Two types of runs were presented during the experiment: neutral and financial (Fig. 3). For each trial, participants indi-
cated their choice (Go/No–Go) by pressing a button on the response pad. After each response, the participants received a
feedback that informed on the response accuracy (OK, for a successful landing or a justified go-around; NO, for an erroneous
decision to land or an unjustified go-around). During the financially motivated condition, the emotional consequences asso-
ciated with a go-around were simulated by a payoff matrix. This matrix was designed to bias responses in favor of landing
acceptance. A go-around was systematically punished by a financial penalty. The penalty was less important (ÿ2€) when the
go-around was justified (in the case where rhombuses were clearly too far from their centers) than when it was unjustified
(ÿ5€). This systematic punishment of the decision to go-around artificially reproduced the systematic negative conse-
quences encountered in real life after this decision. A successful landing was rewarded (+5€) whereas an erroneous decision
to land was punished (ÿ2€).
The fact that the erroneous decision to go-around was more punished than the erroneous decision to land may appear
counterintuitive but the payoff matrix was set up in this way for two reasons. Firstly, in real life, pilots know that crash
and overrun are rather unlikely events whereas the negative consequences associated with a go-around are systematic.
The analysis of unstabilized approach events confirms that they rarely lead to an accident in spite of frequent risk-taking
(Rhoda and Pawlak, 1999). As a consequence, the expected value (EV) of a landing decision has to remain positive in the
experimental design to reproduce this psychological aspect. Secondly, the detection of the cerebral activation would have
been difficult with a too low number of repetitions of the same condition (i.e. a decision to land that provokes a crash).
Fig. 2. Categorization of the level of uncertainty according to the rhombuses positions. The rhombuses positions were counterbalanced to avoid laterality
effects. The order of presentation of the stimuli was randomized.
Fig. 3. The various feedbacks displayed after each decision making. During the neutral condition, only the accuracy feedback was delivered (OK/NO). During
the financially motivated condition, the financial consequences (reward/punishment) were also displayed, after the accuracy feedback.
The low signal-to-noise ratio of fMRI requires a great number of repetitions of stimuli under the same condition. For this
reason, we choose to apply a low punishment for erroneous landings rather than diminishing their likelihood of occurrence
and administrating a very high punishment when it happened (which would have been closer to real life where crashes are
rare but have immeasurable costs). To summarize, the expected value of the gain/loss after the decision to land was
positive ((0.5  5€) ÿ (0.5  ÿ2€) = + 1.50€), whereas it was clearly negative after the decision to go-around ((0.5  ÿ2€) +
(0.5  ÿ5€) = ÿ3.50€). Our goal was not to monetize precisely the cost of a go-around, since such a calculation would be
quite complex to perform. Monetary incentive simply allowed reproducing the conflicting positive/negative emotional con-
sequences attached with the landing decision. The values of gains and losses were chosen to be plausible for the participants,
as they were told that they would be rewarded according to them.
At the end of each run, a global feedback indicated the percentage of correct responses, the ‘‘safety score’’. Moreover, at
the end of the financially motivated run only, another feedback indicated the cumulative amount of money gain or loss, the
‘‘financial score’’. These two scores are conflicting since the optimization of the ‘‘financial score’’ can only be obtained at the
expense of the ‘‘safety score’’ as it necessarily implies a dangerous increase of the landing acceptance rate. Eventually,
participants were explained that, as in real life, taking into account the flight safety was essential in the experiment.
Stimulus display and data acquisition were done with Cogent 2000 v125 (a software environment for functional brain
mapping experiments that allows presenting scanner-synchronized stimuli) running under Matlab environment (Matlab
7.2.0.232, R2006a, The MathWorks, USA). Each trial (see Fig. 4) consisted in the display of the stimulus (2.5 s) during which
the participant performed the decision making thanks to a response pad, followed after a delay (10 s) by the feedback
informing of the accuracy of the response (0.5 s). During the financially motivated condition only, the financial outcome, con-
tingent of the participants’ response, was displayed during 1.5 s. An inter-trial interval (10 s) was introduced (an amount of
time between the end of the feedback display and the display of the next stimulus). Before the experiment, participants per-
formed two runs (neutral and financial) to become familiar with the task and the payoff matrix.
2.3. Functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment
The experiment was conducted at the neuroimaging laboratory of the Santa Lucia Foundation (Roma). All the data were
acquired in a single session on a 3 T Allegra scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) with a maximum gra-
dient strength of 40 mT/m, using a standard quadrature birdcage head coil for both RF (Radio Frequency) transmission and
RF reception. The fMRI data were acquired using a gradient echo-EPI (Echo Planar Imaging), with 38 axial slices with a voxel
size of 3  3  3.75 mm3 (matrix size 64  64; FOV (Field Of View) 192  192 mm2) in ascending order. The acquisition time
was 2.47 s/65 ms/slice. Data analysis was performed within SPM8 analytic package (Statistical Parametric Mapping 8, Well-
come Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The data were sinc-interpolated in time and re-aligned to the first
acquired volume to correct head motion. A mean functional image volume was constructed for each subject from the re-
aligned image volumes. This mean image was spatially normalized to a Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) EPI template
with affine registration followed by nonlinear transformation. The normalization parameters determined for the mean func-
tional volume were then applied to the corresponding functional image volumes for each subject. Spatial normalization of
neuroimaging data is a standard step when assessing group effects. All participants’ brain images were warped to a stan-
Fig. 4. Diagrammatic illustration of the experimental design. The two types of experimental runs (neutral and financially motivated) are showed.
dard space (MNI space, which is the average of 152 normal MRI scans) to match a comparable standard size, orientation and
shape. This allows identifying activated brain structures independently from individual differences in the size and overall
shape of the brain. Finally, images were smoothed with an isotropic 8-mm full-width-half-maximum Gaussian kernel to cor-
rect for remaining inter-subject anatomy variability. For reporting, MNI coordinates were converted into Talairach (TAL)
space (another widely used standard space) using Wake Forest University Pickatlas (WFU-Pickatlas, version 2.4) (Maldjian
et al., 2004). Talairach atlas Anatomical regions were identified using the Talairach Daemon Client, version 2.2.4. The Talai-
rach Daemon gives Talairach Atlas labels (i.e. anatomical region labels) for a given x, y, z coordinate and allows to identify
anatomical regions with a specified tolerance (3 mm3 in our analysis). The fMRI design was identical to that of the behavioral
study except that the delay between the stimulus and the feedback (6–10 s) and that the inter-trial intervals were variables
(3–9 s) for neuroimaging technical requirements. We focused our investigations on the decision making cerebral processes.
The hemodynamic response measured by fMRI (i.e. related to the neural activity) peaks at 4–6 s and lasts over 10 s. The long
variable delay before the feedback allowed us to dissociate the hemodynamic signal associated with the stimulus (the deci-
sion making) from the signal associated with the reward expectancies during the delay (the expectancies of a reward/pun-
ishment also generates a cerebral activity). The training session was identical to the behavioral task one.
3. Results
3.1. Statistical analysis
We examined two different behavioral dependant variables: percentage of landing acceptance and reaction times (RTs).
The percentage of landing acceptance gave a direct indication on the behavioral shift generated by the financial incentive.
We also analyzed RTs to confirm that ambiguous stimuli generated a high uncertainty. This higher level of uncertainty
should provoked longer RTs before reaching a decision in comparison to non-ambiguous stimuli. This was an important issue
as the effects of emotion on decision making are particularly obvious during complex tasks with high uncertainty. All behav-
ioral data were analyzed with Statistica 7.1 (Ó StatSoft). The Kolmogorov–Smirnov goodness-of-fit test showed that data dis-
tribution was not normal; therefore we used non-parametric tests. The effects of the stimulus type (neutral or financial) and
the level of uncertainty (low or high) on our dependant variables, the percentage of landing and RTs, were examined thanks
to Friedman’s ANOVA.
Presented preliminary analyses focused on the decision-making processes, at the time of the stimulus (instrument with
rhombuses) display. To analyze the brain regions that were more activated during the neutral stimuli, the following contrast
was performed: [Low uncertainty + High uncertainty, Neutral] minus [Low uncertainty + High uncertainty, Financial]. The
opposite contrast, [Low uncertainty + High uncertainty, Financial] minus [Low uncertainty + High uncertainty, Neutral]
was performed to examine brain regions that were more activated during the financially motivated condition. These anal-
yses are based on one sample t-test. Neuroimaging results are presented in table 1 (i.e. 3D coordinates, z-value and cluster
size k).
3.2. Behavioral results
The mean total amount won was positive (13.75€, SD = 11.15) and confirmed that the reward/punishment system has
oriented decision making toward economic optimization as decision that would have been oriented only toward safety
(systematic go-around in case of uncertainty) would have lead participants to get a negative outcome (ÿ70€). Indeed, in
response to the asymmetric payoff matrix, participants demonstrated a significant shift in the likelihood of accepting
landings when uncertainty was high. More precisely, the Friedman’s ANOVA showed that under high uncertainty, the mean
percentage of landing acceptance increased in response to the financial incentive, from 30.71% (SD = 11.83) to 69.88%
(SD = 27.15) (v2(12,1) = 9.00; p = .002), see Fig. 5.
The Friedman’s ANOVA also revealed an overall effect of uncertainty (both types of incentive included). Ambiguous
stimuli generated longer mean RTs than non-ambiguous ones (v2(12,1) = 18.0, p < .001), see Fig. 6. In addition, there was
Table 1
Brain area and Brodmann number, Talairach 3D coordinates (anatomical identification), Z-score (Gaussian normalized t-statistics, it gives an indication on the
level of activation) and cluster sizes (k) of the activated anatomical structures for both contrasts, neutral minus financial and financial minus neutral. Cluster
size refers to the number of activated voxels in each region. All activations were significant at threshold p < .001 uncorrected. Bilateral regions of the VMPFC
(BA11) were found to be more activated when the task was performed with the financially motivated condition in comparison to the neutral condition. On the
opposite, the right DLPFC (46) was more activated during the neutral condition in comparison to the financially motivated condition.
Brain area (BA) Neutral minus Financial Brain area (BA) Financial minus Neutral
Talairach coordinates Talairach coordinates
x y z Z-score k x y z Z-score k
Frontal Frontal
DLPFC (BA46) 53 36 19 2.35 22 VMPFC (BA11) ÿ12 42 ÿ24 2.33 21
an interaction between the type of stimuli and the level of uncertainty. When uncertainty was high, RTs where shorter dur-
ing financially motivated condition in comparison to the neutral condition (v2(12,1) = 8.00, p = .004).
3.3. fMRI results
The six participants that performed the task in the scanner demonstrated behavioral results that were coherent with the
previous larger behavioral group. The financial incentive generated a shift in the likelihood of accepting landings under high
uncertainty (v2(6,1) = 15.00; p < .001), from 45.83% (SD = 16.63) in the neutral condition to 65.83% (SD = 7.37) of landing
acceptance in the financially motivated condition. Moreover, RTs were longer when the uncertainty was high
(v2(6,1) = 6.0; p < .001). We also found an interaction between the type of stimuli and uncertainty: when uncertainty was
high, RTs where shorter during financially motivated condition in comparison to the neutral condition (v2(6,1) = 6.25;
p = .012).
Fig. 5. Reaction times (in ms) according to the level of uncertainty (low and high) for both types of stimuli (neutral and financial).
Fig. 6. Percentage of landing acceptance according to both type of incentive (Neutral and Financial) during high uncertainty stimuli only (50%). Whereas
participants demonstrated a conservative behavior during the neutral condition (below 50% of landing acceptance) they made more risky decision during
the financially motivated condition (far beyond 50% of landing acceptance).
We investigated brain regions that were involved during decision making, depending on the type of stimuli. The first con-
trast [Low uncertainty + High uncertainty, Neutral] minus [Low uncertainty + High uncertainty, Financial] revealed that cold
decision-making activated right DLPFC (Brodmann area1 46; p < .001; cluster size = 22). Our main interest in this study was to
examine which regions were more activated during hot decision-making. We then performed a second contrast [Low uncer-
tainty + High uncertainty, Financial] minus [Low uncertainty + High uncertainty, Neutral] to analyze decision making during
the financially motivated condition. We found that hot decision-making increased activity in bilateral VMPFC (Brodmann area
11; p < .001; cluster size = 21) (Fig. 7). An additional analysis examining the effects of the financial incentive only during high
uncertainty stimuli [High uncertainty, Financial] minus [High uncertainty, Neutral] gave coherent results with larger bilateral
VMPFC activations (larger cluster size) than the previous analysis that included both levels of uncertainty (Brodmann area 11;
ÿ3, 47, ÿ11; p < .001; cluster size = 30; Z = 3.14).
4. Discussion
Our hypothesis was that a large range of strong negative emotional consequences attached to the go-around decision pro-
vokes a temporary impairment of the decision-making process and favors PCE. To better understand the underlying neural
mechanisms, we designed a brain imaging protocol where financial incentive and uncertainty were manipulated while par-
ticipants were performing a landing decision task. The behavioral results were in accordance with our expectations. The
uncertainty level generated two types of decision-making: when the rhombuses positions were non-ambiguous, all partic-
ipants reported that the decision was straightforward. On the contrary, when the rhombuses positions were ambiguous they
tried hard to find a rule. These assertions were supported by longer RTs when the ambiguity was high. Such results were
predictable and suggest that low uncertainty stimuli were easily categorized and that high uncertainty stimuli tended to
provoke a more difficult decision-making.
Moreover, the payoff matrix encouraged participants to avoid financial loss and maximize their monetary reward and
biased their response criterion from safety to economic considerations. The volunteers showed a significant shift in the re-
sponse criterion and a trend to increase their landing acceptance rate under the influence of the financial incentive. Whereas
their behaviors were rather conservative in the neutral condition, they made more risky decisions during the financially
motivated condition to avoid the risk of a penalty in the case of go-around. This effect was particularly true when the uncer-
tainty was high. In addition, concerning stimuli with high uncertainty only, RTs were shorter during the financially moti-
vated condition, showing more compulsive and reward-weighted decision-making. These results were quite comparable
Fig. 7. (a) Bilateral VMPFC activations (BA11) during stimuli display for financially motivated condition minus neutral condition. (b) Right DLPFC activation
(BA46) during stimuli display for neutral condition minus financially motivated condition (c) global view for both contrasts. Effects of financial incentive are
displayed in green; effects of neutral condition are displayed in red (p < 0.001; cluster > 15). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
1 Brodmann area, defined and numbered by the German anatomist Korbinian Brodmann, are structurally distinguishable and presumably functionally
distinct regions into which the cortex of each cerebral hemisphere can be divided.
to those of the neuroeconomics study conducted by Taylor Taylor et al. (2004) where monetary incentive and task complex-
ity negatively impacted performances to a short-term memory task and increased the number of false items recognition.
Our preliminary neuroimaging results suggest that the payoff matrix biased emotionally decision making. Indeed, the
change in decision-making criterion entailed by the financial incentive was subserved by a shift from a cerebral region ded-
icated to reasoning, the DLPFC, to a region involved in emotional processing, the VMPFC. It should be noted that an additional
analysis that focused on financial incentive effect during high uncertainty stimuli only, gave coherent results with even lar-
ger bilateral VMPFC activations than the analysis that considered overall financial incentive effect (both type of uncertainty
included). These outcomes confirmed the hypothesized emotional and cognitive subdivisions within the prefrontal cortex
(Goel and Dolan, 2003). Cold decision-making appeared to be more analytic and safety oriented whereas hot decision-mak-
ing was associated with a search for reward at the expense of safety. Taken together, our results are coherent with the neu-
roscientific literature that shows that the reciprocal influence of cognition and emotion are meditated by specialized brain
subdivisions (Mitchell and Phillips, 2007; Simpson et al., 2001). We are aware that our simplified landing situation, due to
fMRI requirements, was far from a real flight situation. Moreover a strong limitation of this study is the limited sample of
non-pilots participants. However, a similar experiment, where physiological measurements were performed in 19 pilots,
demonstrated the same response pattern: an increased number of landing acceptance during the financially motivated con-
dition when uncertainty was high (Causse et al., 2011a). Moreover, the physiological results showed that heart rate was
higher during the financially motivated condition in comparison to the neutral condition, demonstrating that the financial
incentive provoked a substantial emotional arousal. Eventually, though the human and economical consequences of our sim-
plified landing task had nothing to compare with real flight issues, the payoff matrix designed to reproduce the negative
emotional consequences linked with the decision to go-around was efficient enough to provoke risky behavior such as
PCE. The gap between reality and laboratory exists in every fMRI experiment that examines the relationship between emo-
tion and cognition. Nevertheless such an approach with simplified situations was initiated by neuroeconomics and has pro-
vided new theoretical issues for behavioral economy. Whereas neuroimaging results can be more conclusive (and
extrapolated to real-life situation) in less context-dependant neural processes, for instance like those involved in reading,
emotional related neural processes are more difficult to apprehend and generalization to everyday life is sometime quite
questionable. However we assume that this controlled laboratory experiment involved quite generic processes related to
emotional influence on decision making and brings a part of explanation concerning risky decision-making observed in pilots
when facing uncertainty and emotional pressures.
The shift from cold to hot decision-making offers interesting theoretical prospects for aviation safety. At least in part, PCE
could be the result, of the different aversive negative consequences associated with the go-around decision, such as the
financial cost for the company. Despite its limitations, the present study confirms the interest of merging cognitive neuro-
sciences with cognitive ergonomics (Sarter and Sarter, 2003) within a neuroergonomics approach (Parasuraman and Rizzo,
2007) to refine the underlying mechanisms of human error (Fedota and Parasuraman, 2010). Very few studies have used
fMRI means in aviation safety. Despite limits in terms of task realism, such a technique presents an excellent spatial reso-
lution and allows observing precisely which brain regions, and as a consequence which cognitive processes, are involved
during specific complex human tasks. In addition, the use of image-processing techniques such as independent component
analysis (Calhoun et al., 2005; Meda et al., 2009) is expected to allow more dynamic and ecological protocols in the future.
Moreover, less spatially accurate but less invasive methods such as magneto-encephalography (Fort et al., 2010), electro-
encephalography (Dussault et al., 2005) or near infra-red spectroscopy (Takeuchi, 2000) has to be considered as they allow
experiments in more realistic situations, for instance in full flight simulators.
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